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THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES
ACT'S EVOLVING GENOCIDE
EXCEPTION

Vivian GrosswaldCurran*

ABSTRACT

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) was passed by Congress
as a comprehensive statute to cover all instances when foreign states are to
be immune from suit in the courts of the UnitedStates, as well as when foreign
state immunity is to be limited. Judicial interpretationof one of the FSIA's
exceptions to immunity has undergone significant evolution over the years
with respect toforeign stateproperty expropriationscommitted in violation of
international law. US courts initially construed this FSIA exception by
denying immunity only if the defendant state had expropriatedproperty of a
citizen ofa nation other than itself Later, such suits were allowed even where
the plaintiffs were deemed by courts to have been formal citizens so long as
they had not been treatedas such at the time ofthe expropriation. This tended
to occur where states had dispossessed groups of citizens, often minority
populations, of theirproperty rights, and often coincided with grave human
rights violations. The courts applied a test of substantive over formal
citizenship that had been used in relatedareas of the law.
In the most recent appellatedecisions that consideredthe issue, however,
the Seventh Circuit and the DC Circuit discardednationality entirely as a

* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh, Vice-President, International
Academy of Comparative Law, Honorary President, American Society of Comparative Law.
Portions of this article were given as talks at the University of Wisconsin Law School and as
the 2017 John Sumner Stead Lecture at the University of Baltimore Law School. My thanks to
the audiences for their valuable comments.
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criterion to abrogate immunity if a court considers the defendant state's
expropriationto have been part of a policy of genocide. The DC Circuithas
gone still further in its latest cases and equates the act of property
expropriation with genocide. Both circuits initially also imposed a new
exhaustion of local remedies requirement. As of 2018, a conflict exists
between the two circuits on that issue.
The genocide interpretation with the imposition of exhaustion distorts
both the FSIA and customary international law. It risks trivializing the
concept ofgenocide, and in the Seventh Circuitit removes exhaustionfrom its
international law roots in cases that occur exclusively in international
tribunals by inserting the requirement into a domestic court framework.
Neither development is consistent with the FSIA statute. Coupling the new
genocide category with an exhaustion requirement also has a net effect of
deprivingplaintiffs of recovery inasmuch as lawsuits in the foreign defendant
states are unlikely to succeed, and the obstacles are steepfor persuading US
federal courts subsequently to retry a case once an adverseforeignjudgment
has been issued.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (variously "FSIA" or the "Act")
was passed by Congress in 1976.1 Before then, international and US views on
foreign sovereign immunity had undergone significant transitions, and US
sovereign immunities law had become less coherent as courts deferred to
executive branch decisions that were not known for mutual consistency,
creating what the Supreme Court once described as "bedlam" in the law.2 Of
signal note in the legal evolution of sovereign immunity law both
internationally and in the United States was a trend towards granting foreign
states immunity from suit for their public acts only. Under this restrictive
view of immunity, foreign states were not immune to jurisdiction in US courts
for their commercial activity.3
As a result of the increasingly confused condition of US law, Congress
enacted the FSIA to be a comprehensive statute that removed jurisdictional
decisions from the executive branch to the judiciary. Subsequently, the US
Supreme Court stated of the Act that "[t]he key word ... is comprehensive."
In that case, NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina, the Court further made
explicit that congressional enactment of a comprehensive statute on foreign
sovereign immunity means that the statutory text must be the judiciary's sole
consideration in interpreting it: "[A]ny sort of immunity defense made by a
foreign sovereign in an American court must stand on the Act's text. Or it must
fall." Congress itself had gone somewhat less far than that in the FSIA's text,
requiring conformity only to its "principles," not to its "text": "Claims of
foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts . . . in

' Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§1602-1611 (1976).
of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 573 U.S. 134, 141 (2014).

2Republic

3 This growing trend was noted in a letter issued by the US Department of State, in which it

)

also announced the Executive Branch's adoption of the new approach, known as "restrictive"
sovereign immunity, in contrast to the "absolute" version. See Alfred Dunhill of London v.
Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 707-11 (1976) (letter reprinted in its entirety). For an account
of the restrictive theory of immunity in the United States and other nations, see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS § 451, reporters' note 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1987)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]; Garb v. Republic of Poland, 440 F.3d 579, 585 (2d. Cir.
2006). For an overview of law outside the United States, see Ilaria Queirolo, Immunity, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

896-99.

4 Republic ofArgentina, 573 U.S. at 141 (emphasis in original); referringto Republic of Austria

v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 699 (2004) and Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S.
480, 493 (1983).
5

Republic ofArgentina, 573 U.S. at 142.
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conformity with the principles setforth [herein]."6
Foreign sovereign immunity has been described by the US Supreme
Court as never having been a matter of right, but always of "grace and
comity."' Concurring in this assessment, Ian Brownlie, the author of one of
the seminal English-language works on international law, cites in his
PrinciplesofPublic InternationalLaw' Justice Marshall's premise that every
state's jurisdiction within its national territory is "necessarily exclusive and
absolute." 9 According to Justice Marshall, a state's jurisdiction "is susceptible
of no limitation not imposed by itself."
The FSIA establishes such a
limitation to US jurisdiction, creating a presumption that a foreign state will
not be subject to civil suit in the United States."
This grant of immunity from civil liability to foreign sovereigns sued in
the United States is subject to exceptions enumerated in Section 1605 of the
Act. One of these, Section 1605(a)(3), deprives a foreign state of its immunity
where the defendant state has expropriated property in violation of
international law:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts
of the United States or of the States in any case(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of international law
are in issue and that property or any property exchanged for such
property is present in the United States in connection with a
commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
state; or that property or any property exchanged for such property is
owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state
and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity
in the United States.12
It is this particular exception which has been the object of genocide-related
suits. Over time, it has been subject to a series of judicial interpretations, the

6 28

U.S.C. § 1602.

7 Altmann, 541 U.S. at 711, quoting Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486 and Dole Food Co. v.
Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 479 (2003). Accord, Republic ofArgentina, 573 U.S. at 140.
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 326 (7th ed. 2008).
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116, 136 (1812).
to BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 323-36 (discussing the doctrine in international law). For a
succinct overview of the historical evolution of the doctrine in the United States, see, e.g., GARY
B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS

(5th ed. 2011) 231-36.
" Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993).
12 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2016).
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latest of which have taken it a good distance from the FSIA's text.
As its language makes clear, Section 1605(a)(3) deals exclusively with
property expropriation. The FSIA's exception for non-commercial torts was
not of assistance to victims of foreign state abuse because it requires those
torts to be committed on the territory of the United States:
[M]oney damages [may be] sought against a foreign state for personal
injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the
United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign
state or of any official or employee of that foreign state while acting
within the scope of his office or employment. 3
Although Congress proposed bills to amend the FSIA to provide
jurisdiction for tort suits where the gravest human rights violations had
occurred, regardless of location, such bills were not enacted. In the absence
of such a provision, plaintiffs who had been victims of the Holocaust or
Armenian genocide tend to frame claims for property expropriation where the
property at issue might be of trivial value, but coexisted with physical and
moral atrocities the victim had undergone, but for which the FSIA provides
no recourse.
Initially, where a foreign state had expropriated property from its own
citizens, US courts found the Section 1605(a)(3) exception to immunity
inapplicable under a domestic takings exception, and therefore found that they
did not have jurisdiction to hear the case.' 4 These holdings were motivated
by the principle of comity underlying foreign sovereign immunity, pursuant
to which states try not to interfere with the internal affairs of other states. 15
Moreover, so long as a state was sued for actions taken towards its own
citizens, such acts were considered to lie outside the purview of international
law, and thus not to involve a "violation of international law" within the
meaning of Section 1605(a)(3).16
This result created considerable unease, however, as it could leave
victims of unspeakable horrors with no recourse against foreign states under

13

Id.

14 See infra Part II.
15

For a thorough overview of international comity in US courts, see William S. Dodge,

International Comity in American Law,

115 COLUM. L. REv. 2071 (2015). See also

RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 405

(AM.

LAW. INST. 2018) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (FOURTH)] (as a matter of prescriptive comity,
"courts seek to avoid unreasonable interference with the legitimate sovereign authority of other
states" in the interpretation of federal statutes).
16

See Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1105 (9th Cir. 1990).
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the FSIA if they had been nationals of those states at the time of the acts at
issue, even when those victims were US citizens or residents at the time of
bringing legal action in the United States.'" Eventually, the courts created an
exception to the domestic takings rule for situations in which the defendant
state had expropriated property of people only nominally its citizens, such as
those whom it had not considered or treated as full citizens at the time of the
expropriations, often minority populations against whom it had been
discriminating. 1
In a more recent development, the Seventh Circuit created an exception
to immunity that did not consider victim nationality, but found FSIA
jurisdiction where the claimed expropriation related to a policy of genocide,
without further inquiry.' 9 This reasoning was extended in later decisions by
the DC Circuit that equated the act of property expropriation with genocide,
such that the very dispossession of the property is deemed to constitute
genocide under the FSIA, in one case in explicit contradistinction to its being
part of a policy of genocide.2 0
It will be argued here that the FSIA's initial human rights gap had been
resolved before the latest judicial development of a genocide category in the
context of property expropriation, and that the analytical framework of FSIA
interpretation had evolved adequately for genocide-related cases by the
courts' inquiry into nationality as a substantive rather than a formalistic
concept. Existing criteria to offset official citizenship where the plaintiff had
not been treated as a full citizen by the offending state allowed for victim
compensation in the genocide-related cases without the need for a judiciallycreated genocide exception. 2
However well-intentioned the courts may have been in developing the
new FSIA subcategory, which was nowhere to be found within the statute
itself, it would be particularly regrettable for US courts to set a precedent that
trivializes the concept of genocide, a concept and claim already fraught with
politicization on the world stage.22 The new subcategory has also been
coupled with a requirement to exhaust local remedies, a combination that
effectively means plaintiffs are being sent to foreign courts where their

See, e.g., Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
E.g., Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2010) (Jews in Nazi Germany).
See infra Part V.
19 See infra PartVI.
1

20

See id.

21

Id.
See infra Part VII, A, andsources cited therein.

22
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chances of succeeding are exceedingly slim,23 and their sole hope of being
reheard in the United States is meeting the extremely high bar of persuading
a US court to proceed with a new trial in the face of a foreign judgment. This
may produce inconsistent judgments and the possible unpleasantness of a US
court's offending the contemporaneous foreign state whose judiciary has
dismissed the case or ruled in favor of its state. Under this regimen of coupling
a new apparent FSIA exception to immunity when genocide is at issue with a
requirement of exhausting local remedies, plaintiffs have a much smaller
chance of prevailing on a FSIA jurisdiction argument than under the situation
that had developed before the genocide subcategory.
The exhaustion requirement has arisen from Section 1605's reference to
"international law." Confusion as to international law requirements may have
stemmed from silence on the part of the Restatement (Third) of United States
ForeignRelations ("Restatement Third") § 713 with respect to exhaustion of
local remedies in domestic courts. Customary international law does not have
such a requirement unless a proceeding is preliminary to one before an
international tribunal. Fortunately, the Restatement (Fourth) has expressly
remedied this ambiguity,2 4 and it is to be hoped that future judicial decisions
will take heed of this clarification as the courts seek to balance the FSIA's text
and purpose with international law in their interpretations.
II.

FOREIGN

STATES'

EXPROPRIATIONS

OF

THEIR

OWN

CITIZENS' PROPERTY: AN EXCEPTION TO AN EXCEPTION

The House Report on the legislative history of the FSIA discusses takings
in violation of international law as including "takings which are arbitrary or
discriminatory in nature," 2 5 and for which the victim has not received
"prompt, adequate and effective compensation."26 It does not discuss the issue
of the victim's citizenship. In Verlinden, where a Dutch corporation sued the
state of Nigeria in the United States for breach of a letter of credit, the Second
Circuit concluded that (1) Congress probably had not considered the

23 Since the development of the new criteria is recent, only one case has been tried to date in a

foreign state under the new exhaustion requirement. In that case, a Hungarian court made short
shrift of the plaintiff's Holocaust-related claims, dismissing it, among others for the plaintiffs'
paucity of precise documentary evidence of having been dispossessed of her last valuables on
the train stations towards her deportation to a concentration camp. See infra n.141 and
surroundingtext.
24
See RESTATEMENT (FouRTH), supra note 15, § 455.
25
26

H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 20 (1976) reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 6604, 6618.
Id.
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citizenship issue, and (2) the broad language of the FSIA can accommodate
even foreign plaintiffs,27 although jurisdiction under the FSIA is
circumscribed by the Constitution's Article III limitations on all federal
jurisdiction.28 In Verlinden, the citizenship of the victim was an issue only
with respect to the court's jurisdiction, not the expropriation by the defendant
of its own citizen's property.
The issue of citizenship in terms of what became known as "domestic
takings" did not arise until a few years later. In Jafari v. Islamic Republic of
Iran,29 where three current and one former Iranian citizens sued the state of
Iran for property expropriations concerning real property, rental moneys, and
pensions, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois centered its
discussion around the definition of customary international law, or in its older
name, the law of nations, with respect to the victim's citizenship: "[T]he 'law
of nations' does not prohibit a government's expropriation of the property of
its own nationals."3 0 According to the court, this was because, unlike physical
torture, "governmental expropriation is not so universally abhorred that its
prohibition commands the general assent of civilized nations - a prerequisite
to incorporation in the 'law of nations."'3 ' The Jafari court explained its
rationale in terms of non-interference in the internal affairs of foreign states:
"We cannot elevate our American-centered view of governmental taking of
property without compensation into a rule that binds all civilized nations." 32
Dreyfus v. Von Finck3 3 presented both sets of issues: a foreign plaintiff
suing a foreign state in the United States and a plaintiff whose nationality at
the time of the expropriation was that of the defendant state. It concerned,
moreover, a Nazi-era expropriation of a Jewish victim, the sort of property
deprivation over which today the FSIA would be considered to abrogate
immunity either (1) by virtue of such a plaintiff's not having been considered

27

Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320, 324 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 461

U.S. 480 (1983). In the cases that developed the genocide exceptions, the plaintiffs typically
had been foreign-born but became US citizens or residents by the time of the lawsuit.
28

Id. at 324-28.

29 Jafariv. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F. Supp. 209 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
30 Id. at 215 (quoting a case decided under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1350, an
eighteenth-century statute which uses the term "law of nations").
31 Id. (inner quotation marks and reference omitted).
32 Id. (inner quotation marks omitted). "Civilized nations" is a term found in literature about
customary international law to explain the nature of a practice's acceptance for it to be deemed
one of customary international law. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 694, 732,
734 (2004).
33 Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 US. 835 (1976).
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a German citizen at the time of the expropriation in Nazi Germany,3 4 or (2)
pursuant to a genocide exception that ignores citizenship. 5
In Dreyfus, however, the Second Circuit held the law of nations not to
have been violated on the reasoning that international law is a law of states,
not of individuals. 36 The court cited for this proposition a 1937 treatise on the
law of nations and another dating to 1826. This conception of international
law had been accurate up to the Second World War but had been changed by
that war and its aftermath, in particular by the legal principles laid down in the
Nuremberg trials, or, more precisely, the London Charter that preceded those
trials.37 Hersch Lauterpacht, one of the great internationalists of the first half
of the twentieth century whose work was used extensively by the British
prosecution team at Nuremberg to initiate this change,3 8 wrote in 1950 that
"there is no rule of international law which definitely precludes individuals
and bodies other than States from acquiring directly rights under or being
bound by duties imposed by customary or conventional international law..."39
By 1976, the time of the Dreyfus decision, the Second Circuit's statement
cannot be said to have been an accurate representation of international law for
three decades. Almost ten years later, however, the Fifth Circuit cited Dreyfus
in De Sanchez v. Banco Cent. De Nicaraguaas persuasive authority for the
same principle when it reasoned that a Nicaraguan national could not sue
Nicaragua under the FSIA: "International law, as its name suggests, deals with

34 See infra Part V.
35 See infra Part VI.
36 See Dreyfus, 534 F.2d at 24, 31 (quoting Redlich and Kent).
37 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 512-515, 553-602 (4th ed.

1990); THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, et al., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN ANUTSHELL 2 (5th ed.
2017) ("International law was defined traditionally as the law governing relations between
nation-states exclusively. This meant that only states were subjects of and had legal rights and
duties under international law"); id. at 31 (explaining how the individual came to be a subject
of international law in the aftermath of the Second World War: "Modern international human
rights law is largely a post-World War II phenomenon. Its development can be attributed to the
monstrous violations of human rights committed during the Nazi era and to the belief that these
violations and possibly the war might have been prevented had an effective international
system" been in place); Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8,
1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (hereinafter London Charter).
38 For the significance of Lauterpacht's influence, not only on the British but also on the United
States' prosecutorial team, see, e.g., PHILIPPE SANDS, EAST WEST STREET: ON THE ORIGINS OF
"GENOCIDE AND "CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY" 65, 273 (2016).
39 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 4 (1950).
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relations between sovereign states, not between states and individuals." 40
That suit concerned a stop-payment order by the new Nicaraguan
Sandinista's government bank on a certificate of deposit the plaintiff had
purchased under the pre-revolutionary government. The court also reiterated
Dreyfus' reasoning that where a state expropriates the property of its own
nationals, international law is not at issue and, therefore, FSIA § 1605(a)(3) is
inapplicable. Yet at the same time, the Fifth Circuit did recognize that
international legal principles had evolved in this area:

'

Recently, this traditional dichotomy between injuries to states and to
individuals-and between injuries to home-grown and to alien
individuals-has begun to erode. The international human rights
movement is premised on the belief that international law sets a
minimum standard not only for the treatment of aliens but also for the
treatment of human beings generally. 4
However, according to the court, that standard did not encompass property
expropriation: "[T]he standards of human rights that have been generally
accepted-and hence incorporated into the law of nations-are still limited.
They encompass only such basic rights as the right not to be murdered,
tortured, or otherwise subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment;
the right not to be a slave; and the right not to be arbitrarily detained. At
present, the taking by a state of its national's property does not contravene the
international law of minimum human rights."42
Problematically, the De Sanchez court cited F. Palicioy Compania, S.A.,
v. Brush,4 to support its reasoning.44 While De Sanchez, like Dreyfus, was a
FSIA case, Brush had not been analyzed under the FSIA, but under the Act of
State doctrine. As others have noted, the two standards are sometimes
confused but are distinct.4 5 The Supreme Court has described the common

40 De Sanchez v. Banco Cent. de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1396 (5th Cir. 1985).
41

Id. at 1396-97.

Id. at 1397. But see concurring opinion of Judge Rubin ("I cannot agree that 'as long as a
nation injures only its own nationals . . . .' [as the majority states], then no other state's interest
is involved. The interests of the United States are involved if a nation takes property legally
situated within its borders from a person resident in the United States, whether the property is
tangible (as the majority agrees) or intangible. International law forbids, and certainly does not
condone, a nation's taking of private property situated in another nation simply because the
owner of the property is a citizen of the rapacious nation." Id. at 1400.
43 F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
44 De Sanchez, 770 F.2d at 1397 n.16.
42

45

DAVID P. STEWART, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT: A GUIDE

FOR JUDGES 10 (2013).

On the inapplicability of the Act of State doctrine to FSIA cases, see
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law, court-created Act of State doctrine as follows: "The courts of one
independent government will not sit in judgment upon the validity of the acts
of another done within its own territory, even when such government seizes
and sells the property of an American citizen within its boundaries." 4 6 It may
be noted that internationalists were expressing another perspective:
[A] state does not violate any rule of international law if in assessing
the legality of the act of another state it bases its assessment on
international law, provided it correctly applies international law. In an
alternative formulation, a state does not violate any rule of
international law if it adopts the position that that public international
law requires it to apply substantive international law in assessing the
validity of foreign states ... 47
Moreover, the Act of State doctrine as a common law doctrine 48 is to be
distinguished from US foreign sovereign immunity law that since 1976
depends on a comprehensive governing statute. It is a defense that becomes
viable only after jurisdiction has been established, and does not apply to issues
of whether the US court may try the case under § 1605(a)(3).49 Thus, in
Siderman, the Ninth Circuit decided that the applicability of the Act of State
doctrine as a defense would depend on the court's first reaching the decision
to apply the expropriation exception to immunity and to hear the case against
Argentina.o Others have noted that most "courts have failed to come to grips

Mathias Reimann, A Human Rights Exception to SovereignImmunity: Some Thoughts on Princz

&

v. Federal Republic of Germany, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 403, 406 (1995).
46 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 424-425 (1964) (quoting Salimoff
Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 224 (1933)). This definition originated with Underhill
v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) ("Every sovereign state is bound to respect the
independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own territory. Redress of
grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by
sovereign powers as between themselves.").
47 Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Introduction, in INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE STATE IN FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 1, 17 (Elihu Lauterpacht & John G. Collier eds., 1977).
48 See HAZEL Fox CMG, QC & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 50 (Oxford Univ.
Press 3d ed. 2013).
49 RESTATEMENT (FOURTH), supra note 15, § 455.
50 Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 713 (9th Cir. 1992); VED P.
NANDA ET AL., The ExpropriationException, in 1 LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN

U.S. COURTS §3.37, at 6 (2d ed. 2008). The Restatement (Fourth) also points out that the
"Second Hickenlooper Amendment" overruled Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.

398, 423 (which had associated the act of state doctrine with the judiciary's view that the United
States should refrain from judging the acts of other nations) so that the act of state doctrine
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with the relationship of the act of state doctrine to the expropriation exception
contained in the FSIA," 5 ' although the Restatement (Fourth) clarifies the
distinction.5 2
Human rights issues continued to arise under the FSIA, however, and
plaintiffs sought new theories to persuade FSIA courts to try their cases. The
next part analyzes the argument that a defendant state implicitly waives its
immunity from jurisdiction where it has committed grave human rights
violations.
III.

JUS COGENS VIOLATIONS AND WAIVER OF IMMUNITY

Plaintiffs have argued thatjus cogens violations, those regarding the most
fundamental human rights, constitute an implied waiver ofjurisdiction within
the meaning of Section 1605(a)(1). This part of the statute provides that a
foreign state will not be immune from US courtjurisdiction where "the foreign
state waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding
any withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign state may purport to effect
except in accordance with the terms of the waiver." As will be seen from this
par, this argument has failed.
In Princz v. FederalRepublic of Germany53 , the plaintiff was a man who
had continuously been a US citizen. Princz had been living with his parents
and siblings in present-day Slovakia at the time of the Nazi invasion. 54
Because the family was Jewish, they were sent to concentration camps where
his parents and sisters were murdered, his brothers starved to death, and the
plaintiff subjected to all of the horrors associated with the Holocaust.
Plaintiff had been ineligible to receive reparations from Germany under its
post-war laws by reason of his US nationality at the time of the crimes, and
by reason of his not qualifying as a refugee under international law. 56
The district court had held that there was an implied waiver of immunity

would not preclude adjudication of an expropriation claim arising after January 1, 1959, if the
court has jurisdiction to hear it." RESTATEMENT (FOURTH), supra note 15, § 455 reporters' note
12. The first acts described in the De Sanchez claim occurred in 1979, well past 1962. See De
Sanchez v. Banco Cent. de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985).
51 NANDA et al., supra note 50, at 5.
52 RESTATEMENT (FouRTH), supra note 15, § 455 n.12; see also Ilaria Queirolo, Immunity, in
1
LAW 896, 901 (Basedow et al. eds., 2017)
(explaining Act of State doctrine and the FSIA).
53 Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
54
Id. at 1168.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL

5
56

See id.
Id.
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under the FSIA, afortiori because the aggrieved plaintiff was an American
citizen, but principally because
[t]he Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act has no role to play where the
claims alleged involve undisputed acts of barbarism committed by a
one-time outlaw nation which demonstrated callous disrespect for the
humanity of an American citizen, simply because he was Jewish. The
Court cannot permit such a nation, which at the time these barbaric
acts were committed neither recognized nor respected US or
international law, to now block the legitimate claims of a US citizen
by asserting US law to evade its responsibilities.
A government which stands in the shoes of a rogue nation the likes of
Nazi Germany is estopped from asserting US law in this fashion. To
allow otherwise would create a severe imbalance in the reciprocity and
mutual respect which must exist between nations, and would work an
intolerable injustice against the plaintiff and the principles for which
this country stands.5 1

The appellate court reversed, finding that the plaintiff had not satisfied
any of the exceptions to immunity enumerated in FSIA § 1605, the sole bases
for obtaining such an exception according to the US Supreme Court in
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.5' The Princz appellate
court held that even an implied waiver had to include the defendant's intention
to waive immunity, and that to consider jus cogens crimes as implied waivers
of immunity to jurisdiction would violate that standard.59 Moreover, it cited
to the case of Siderman de Blake for the proposition that,
[a]lthough no reported decision considers the ...
specific argument
that a violation of jus cogens norms forfeits immunity under the
implied waiver provision of the FSIA, the Ninth Circuit has stated
broadly that "[t]he fact that there has been a violation ofjus cogens
does not confer jurisdiction under the FSIA." 60
The Siderman case had involved a case of torture and property
expropriation of a Jewish family in Argentina during the time of the antiSemitic Argentine junta. 6 ' The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did
57 Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 813 F. Supp. 22,26 (D.D.C. 1992).
58

Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,488 U.S. 428 (1989) (holding that FSIA
is a comprehensive statute and exceptions to immunity must be established by plaintiffs as
specified thereunder).
59 Princz, 26 F.3d at 1174.
60

Id. (quoting Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 719 (9thCir. 1992).

61 Siderman, 965 F.2d at 703.
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have jurisdiction due to waiver, but the waiver was not triggered by the
discrimination. Rather, it concluded that Argentina had waived its immunity
only because that state had pursued the plaintiffs criminally first, and had
asked for US legal assistance in that undertaking. Although characterizing the
taking as one that violated international law on the basis of ethnic
discrimination, the court ruled that of all the plaintiff family members, only
the daughter had a cause of action because she was a US citizen, and thus, the
expropriation would not be considered a domestic taking in her case.62
As the D.C. Circuit made clear in Princz, US courts reject the idea that jus
cogens violations can be a basis for FSIA jurisdiction:
In Amerada Hess, the Court had no occasion to consider acts of torture
or other violations of the peremptory norms of international law, and
such violations admittedly differ in kind from transgressions of jus
dispositivum, the norms derived from international agreements or
customary international law with which the Amerada Hess Court
dealt. However, the Court was so emphatic in its pronouncement "that
immunity is granted in those cases involving alleged violations of
international law that do not come within one of the FSIA's
exceptions," and so specific in its formulation and method of
approach, ('Having determined that the FSIA provides the sole basis
for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in federal court, we turn
to whether any of the exceptions enumerated in the Act apply here'),
that we conclude that if violations ofjus cogens committed outside the
United States are to be exceptions to immunity, Congress must make
them so. The fact that there has been a violation of jus cogens does not
confer jurisdiction under the FSIA.63
In the words of the Restatement (Fourth), "courts in the United States
construe this [implicit waiver of jurisdiction] exception narrowly."64 These
cases are in a long line of decisions which hold that grave violations of
international customary law do not constitute an implicit waiver of
jurisdictional immunity within the meaning of the FSIA.6 5 The judiciary's
refusal to allow a waiver forjus cogens acts may be understood as arising from
concern that waivers, even implicit waivers, need to have an element of
intention, and thus, that the plaintiffs' theory of implicit waiver for jus cogens

62 Id. at 711.

63 Id., at 718-19 (citations omitted).

15, § 453 reporters' note 1.
P. STEWART, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
FOR JUDGES 43 n. 114 (2013).

64 See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH), supra note
65 For a collection of cases, see DAVID
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT:

A GUIDE

THE FOREIGN

60

23 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. (2019)

acts contradicted the accepted legal concept of waivers as voluntary acts. 66 As
the next part discusses, the courts developed another means to interpret the
domestic takings exception without disturbing these precedents.
IV.

THE DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANTIVE CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS: A
WAY TO DO JUSTICE WITHIN THE LANGUAGE AND INTENT

OF THE FSIA

The Princz decision was controversial, especially in light of an
impassioned dissent by Judge Wald, which was in line with the lower court's
view quoted above that jus cogens violations must constitute waivers of
immunities where dismissing a case for lack of jurisdiction would render a
United States victim with no legal recourse in the face of unspeakable
inhumanity.67
Soon after Princz was decided, one scholar presciently predicted that its
holding was not the end of the story.68 In keeping with the majority views in
Siderman and Princz, subsequent courts did not disturb the finding that a
foreign state's jus cogens violations in and of themselves did not abrogate its
immunity under the FSIA. Nevertheless, consistent with the stated legislative
goal of Congress in enacting Section 1605 to prevent discriminatory takings,69
they began to apply already-operative concepts of citizenship from other areas
of the law to their FSIA citizenship analysis. Thus, they rejected the claim
that a foreign state had committed a domestic expropriation from its own
citizens if the victims had been deprived of civil and political rights at the time
of the expropriation, especially where the victims were part of a minority
population that the state was persecuting.70
In Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain,' the Ninth Circuit adjudicated a

See Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Accord, Mathias
Reimann, A Human Rights Exception to Sovereign Immunity: Some Thoughts on Princz v.
FederalRepublic of Germany, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 403, 406 (1995).
67 Princz, 26 F.3d at 1176-85.
66

68 See Reimann, supra note 45.
69 See supra notes 26-28, and surroundingtext.
70

The Supreme Court established in 2004 that the FSIA could be applied retroactively because
it is a jurisdictional rather than a substantive statute. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S.

677 (2004).
Once the retroactivity issue was settled, cases dealing with Nazi-era expropriations as well as
still earlier ones stemming from significantly earlier times, such as Armenian dispossessions
by the Turkish government and German acts in the late 1 9 th century and early 2 0th in Africa,
increased in number, as will be seen below.
71

Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010).
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§1605(a)(3) FSIA case concerning the forced sale of property by plaintiff's
German-Jewish grandmother on her departure from Nazi Germany in 1939.
The court decided that this did not qualify as a case of a foreign state that had
committed a domestic expropriation because, by 1939, "German Jews had
been deprived of their civil rights, including their German citizenship; their
property was being 'Aryanized' and ... [p]ermission was required both to
leave and to take belongings [out of the country]."72 The Cassirercourt, like
the de Csepel court the following year, was adopting the Seventh Circuit's
definition of the essential attributes of citizenship: "[O]ur concept of a citizen
is one who has the right to exercise all the political and civil privileges
extended by his government... Citizenship conveys the idea of membership in
a nation..."7
After explaining that a victim would not be considered by the US court to
have been a national of the defendant state if that state had not treated it as
one, the Ninth Circuit in Cassirer, sitting en banc, also defined a taking in
violation of international law. It said an expropriation "offends international
law when it does not serve a public purpose, when it discriminates against
those who are not nationals of the country, or when it is not accomplished with
a payment ofjust compensation." 7 4 The Second Circuit had previously issued
a similar definition in 2000, using many of the same terms, based on the
FSIA's legislative history. 5 The FSIA itself does not define takings in
violation of international law. The Restatement (Fourth) notes that, in the
absence of such a statutory definition, US courts look to customary
international law to supply the meaning.7 6
Similarly, in De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary," the D.C. district court
cited with approval the lower court's finding that Hungarian Jews who had
been dispossessed of property during the Second World War were no longer
considered citizens by the Hungarian government." The relevant measures to

72

d

73 de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 808 F.Supp. 2d 113, 130 (D.D.C. 2011), aff'd in part,

rev'd in part, 714 F.3d 591 (D.C. Cir. 2013). (citing KakuNagano v. McGrath, 187 F.2d 759,
768 (7th Cir. 1951)).
74 616 F.3d, at 1027.
75 Zappia Middle East Constr. Co. v. Emirate of Abu Dhabi, 215 F.3d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 2000).
76 See RESTATEMENT (FouRTH), supra note 15, § 455 cmt. c (noting that, where applicable,
courts look to treaties between the U.S. and the defendant state).
77 De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 714 F.3d 591, 598 (D.D.C. 2013) (rehearing en banc
denied June 4, 2013).
78 This would have sufficed for a claim by the plaintiff under the FSIA's expropriation
exception, but not under plaintiff's claim of bailment, the central claim in De Csepel. See id.
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which Hungarian Jews had been subjected included being deprived of the right
to vote, to hold public office, to practice most professions, to serve in the
military, to own property, and being forced to wear a yellow star to mark them
as different, all of which "ultimately [made them] subject to ... genocide." 7 9
Thus, the court concluded that even if the plaintiff "still considered herself to
be a Hungarian citizen in 1944, it is clear that.. .the government of Hungary
thought otherwise and had de facto stripped her...and all Hungarian Jews of
their citizenship rights. "80 This conclusion echoed that of an earlier case
concerning the persecution of Hungarian Jews decided under another statute. 8
A case decided before De Csepel involved a religious organization whose
property had been expropriated by the Soviet government in Russia. 82 A
motion to dismiss under the domestic takings exception failed on the grounds
that plaintiffs had made a non-frivolous argument to the effect that they
constituted a world-wide organization rather than Soviet citizens.83 Thus,
there was no analysis of who should be considered to have been a full-fledged
Soviet citizen at the time of the expropriation, nor any indication of the
substantive citizenship requirement that later courts developed.
The inquiry into the reality, rather than the nomenclature, of nationality
had taken the FSIA to a new point. Courts now were interpreting the statute
according to its goal of allowing jurisdiction for "discriminatory" takings (the
term corresponding to the Act's legal history)8 4 while still immunizing foreign
states for acts towards those who had been their citizens in substance, not just
in form, at the time of the acts at issue. However much the human rights
problems raised in Princz and other cases seemed to have been solved
satisfactorily, judicial interpretation did not stop there.
The recent development of a genocide exception by two circuits and a
California district court is hard to reconcile with Siderman and Princz's
finding that "' [t]he fact that there has been a violation of jus cogens does not

79

Id.; de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 808 F. Supp. 2d 113 129 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
sOld. at 130.
s1 The earlier case was Roboz v. Kennedy, 219 F.Supp. 892, 894 (D.D.C. 1963), in which the
D.C. district court had held that Nazi persecutions occurring in Hungary signified that
Hungarian Jews were not Hungarian citizens within the meaning of the International Claims

Settlement Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1631.
Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Russian Federation, 528 F.3d 934 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

82
8

3 Id. It should be noted that the non-frivolous standard was abandoned for a higher burden of

proof in Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int'l Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct.

1312, 1318-19 (2017).
84 See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH)), supra note

15, § 455, reporters' note 4.
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confer jurisdiction under the FSIA."" It is also hard to reconcile with the
Supreme Court's finding that arguments based on the FSIA must stand or fall
on its text. 86 Recent cases, which are the subject of the next part, have not
attempted to explain how they can be harmonized with the above or with the
established line of cases rejecting implied waiver ofjurisdiction under Section
1605(a)(1).
V.

THE NEW GENOCIDE EXCEPTION TO IMMUNITY

The new turn of affairs started in the Seventh Circuit. In Abelesz v.
Magyar Nemzeti Bank,87 reheard sub nom Fischer v. Magyar Allamvasutak
Zrt.,88 the court ruled that a context of genocide obviated the need for judicial
inquiry into whether a taking was domestic. The plaintiffs were Hungarian
Jews who had been dispossessed of the last property they owned at railroad
stations in 1944 as they were about to be deported from Hungary to Nazi
concentration camps. In Abelesz and Fischer, nationality ceased to be a
criterion to the extent that the court found a defendant state to have been
participating in a genocidal policy towards the plaintiffs:
The international norm against genocide is specific, universal, and
obligatory. Where international law universally condemns the ends,
we do not believe the domestic takings rule can be used to require
courts to turn a blind eye to the means used to carry out those ends-in
this case, widespread expropriation of victims' property to fund and
accomplish the genocide itself. Plaintiffs' allegations of these
expropriations as an integral part[ ] of the overall genocidal plan allege
violations of international law notwithstanding the domestic takings
rule that would apply in most other circumstances. 8 9

Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (alteration in
original).
85

6

Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 573 U.S. 134, 142 (2014).

87 Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2012).

Fischer v. Magyar Allamvasutak Zrt., 777 F.3d 847, 854 (7 th Cir. 2016).
692 F.3d at 676. See also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH), supra note 15, § 455 reporters'
note 4 (referring to these cases as "eliminating the 'domestic takings' rule and permitting claims
to proceed on the basis of allegations that the takings occurred in the context egregious
violations of international law"). The domestic takings exception, distinguishing between
expropriations in violation of international law of a state's own citizens and of foreign citizens,
continues unabated outside of the context of genocide. See Mezerhane v. Reptiblica Bolivariana
de Venezuela, 785 F.3d 545, 549 (11th Cir. 2015) ("[W]hen a foreign nation confiscates the
property of its own nationals, it does not implicate principles of international law.") (citation
omitted); Arch Trading Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, No. 13-CV-4445, 2015 WL 3443906 at
89 Abelesz,
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Cases involving the precise issue of FSIA Section 1605(a)(3) claims are
sufficiently few in number that both district and circuit courts have tended to
look to authority from beyond their jurisdictional borders when dealing with
the issues the subpart raises. Thus, the year after Abelesz was decided by an
Illinois district court, a California district court, citing to Abelesz, dispensed
with the nationality inquiry in a §1605(a)(3) case against the Republic of
Turkey and two Turkish banks involving property confiscated from
Armenians during the Armenian genocide of 1915.90 The case followed
Abelesz in forswearing the domestic takings principle in the context of
genocide, explicitly citing Abelesz, and went one step farther by specifically
holding that the Armenian plaintiffs, unlike the Hungarian Jews in Abelesz,
had been deemed full citizens of the Ottoman Empire at the time of the
genocide. Rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that the victims had not been
full-fledged citizens at the time of the takings, the court completely discarded
the domestic takings rule while holding simultaneously that the victims had
been full-fledged citizens of the defendant state yet could recover for property
expropriation under its application of Abelesz:
[I]t is clear that ethnic Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire during
the events giving rise to this lawsuit were Ottoman citizens. At the
hearing, Plaintiffs asserted that the ethnic Armenians living in the
Ottoman Empire were treated as defacto non-citizens in the same way
as Jews living in Nazi-era Germany. The German Jews, however, had
been stripped of their citizenship as a result of the Reichsbitrgergesetz
[Reich Citizenship Law], Sept. 15, 1935, RGB1. 1, at 1146. See
generally Richard J. Evans, The Third Reich in Power 544 (2005)
("The Reich Citizenship Law defined citizens of the Reich exclusively
as people of 'German or kindred blood.' ... [T]he Jews ... were merely
'subjects of the state.' They had 'obligations towards the Reich' but
were given no political rights in return."). Legally, Armenians whose
property was taken and who were deported from the Ottoman Empire
were citizens at the time. 91
Had the court applied the doctrine of substantive citizenship explained

*2 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2015) (holding that where plaintiffs were companies owned by
Ecuadorian citizens and located in that country, their expropriation "does not concern United
States courts."), aff'd 839 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2016); Smith Rocke Ltd. v. Repfiblica Bolivariana
de Venezuela, No. 12-CV-7316, 2014 WL 288705, at *7-9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2014).
90 Davoyan v. Republic of Turkey, 116 F. Supp. 3d 1084, 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2013). See also You
v. Japan, No. C 15-03257 WHA, 2015 WL 6689398, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2015) (citing
Abelesz' genocide exception with approval).
.

91 Id. at 1099
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above in Part IV, it might have reached the conclusion that, however
ostensibly classified under Turkish law, where a nominal citizen was subject
to the stripping of all rights and subject to being murdered by virtue solely of
ethnic origin in a policy of genocide, a US court does not categorize such a
person as having been a citizen of the foreign state for purposes of FSIA
analysis. Thus, in the absence of the new genocide exception, the substantive
citizenship doctrine would have been sufficient to protect the Davoyan
plaintiffs.
Abelesz, Fischer, and Davoyan all stand for the proposition that the
domestic takings exception is unnecessary and inapplicable where the
expropriation is part of a defendant state's policy of genocide. In 2016, Simon
v. Republic of Hungary92 went yet a step further. The facts of Simon were
similar to those in Abelesz and Fischer, where Hungarian Jews were stripped
of their last possessions before being deported from Hungary to Nazi
concentration camps. In this case, however, both the D.C. district and circuit
courts held that acts of property dispossession, no matter how small, were
themselves genocide, emphasizing this difference in the opinion: "[W]e see
the expropriations as themselves genocide."93 In 2017, in Philipp v. Federal
Republic of Germany,94 a case involving a Jewish-owned art treasure known
as the Welfenschatz, sold during the Nazi era under coerced circumstances,
the court echoed the D.C. Circuit in Simon.9 5 The Philipp lower court quoted
the D.C. Circuit's Simon opinion as follows: "The D.C. Circuit has recognized
that takings may fall within the expropriation exception when 'the takings of
property described in the complaint bear a sufficient connection to genocide
that they amount to takings 'in violation of international law." In such
situations, the expropriations themselves constitute genocide...'"96
A close reading of both cases suggests a difference between the two cases
inasmuch as the D.C. district court in Philipp implies the importance of the
expropriation as an integral part of a policy of genocide, as did Abelesz and
Fischer. In contrast, taken as a whole, the Simon court focuses more on
equating expropriation with genocide, seemingly to the point of separating the
expropriation act from the overall policy.

92

Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 812 F.3d 127 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

93 Id. at 142 (emphasis in original).
94 Philipp v. Federal Republic of Germany, 248 F. Supp. 3d 59, 70 (D.D.C. 2017); aff'd and

remanded, 894 F.3d 406 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
95 According to Plaintiffs, the Welfenschatz art collection sale was coerced by Goering who
later presented it as a gift to Hitler. See Philipp, 894 F. 3d at 409.
96
Phillip, 248 F.Supp.3d at 70 (quoting Simon, 812 F.3d at 142).
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Meanwhile, the Eleventh Circuit has indicated its inclination to apply the
genocide exception and impose the exhaustion rule. 9 7 In Mezerhane, the
Eleventh Circuit granted Venezuela immunity where the court distinguished
the facts at bar from those in Abelesz because no genocide was involved in
plaintiffs' allegations.98 In the 2018 Camparelli case, the Eleventh Circuit
cited Abelesz's exhaustion of local remedies rule with approval, 99 as did the
Eastern District of Virginia in a case against Belgium.' 00 So far, federal
district courts in New York are withholding decisions until the Second Circuit
has a case on exhaustion.'o'
One may wonder why it would be problematic or so noteworthy that
courts sought to create an exception to Section 1605 (a) (3) FSIA immunity
for acts associated with genocide, since the development of the substantive
citizen doctrine had a similar aim and effect of protecting victims of grave
international human rights violations. The problem is principally two-fold and
is the subject of the next part.
VI.

WHY THE GENOCIDE EXCEPTION IS PROBLEMATIC:
TRIVIALIZING GENOCIDE AND AN EXHAUSTION
REQUIREMENT NOT DERIVED FROM CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW

A.

TrivializingGenocide

Genocide is a term that was coined by the international legal scholar
Raphael Lemkin. In Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, Lemkin's subtitle for his
chapter on "Genocide" is "A New Term and New Conception for Destruction
of Nations."102 He defines genocide as having "the aim of annihilating the

" See Mezerhane v. Repfiblica Bolivariana Venezuela, 785 F.3d 545 (11th Cir. 2015), cert.

denied, 136 S. Ct. 800 (2016); Comparelli v. Rep6blica Bolivariana Venezuela, 891 F.3d 1311
(11th Cir. 2018).
* Mezerhane, 785 F.3d at 551.
9 Comparelli, 891 F.3d at 1327.
100 Best Med. Belgium, Inc. v. Kingdom of Belgium, 913 F. Supp.2d 230, 240 (E.D. Va. 2012).
101 See Chettri v. Nepal Bangladesh Bank, Ltd., No. 10 Civ. 8470(PGG), 2014 WL 4354668, at
18 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). In 2017 plaintiffs filed suit in the Southern District of New York under
FSIA §1605 (a) (3) for expropriations related to genocide by Germany against the African
Ovahoro people some half century before the Holocaust. As of this writing, the court granted
the defendant's Motion to Dismiss claiming, among others, state immunity, without reaching
the exhaustion issue. Rukoro v. Federal Republic of Germany, No. 17 CV 62-LTS, 2019 WL

1060030, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), appeal filed March 11, 2019, No. 19-609.
102 RAPHAEL LEMKIN, Axis RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE: LAWS OF OCCUPATION. ANALYSIS OF
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groups themselves ... [and as being] directed against the national group as an
entity, and the actions involved are against individuals, not in their individual
capacity, but as members of the national group."' 03 He wrote elsewhere that
"by the formulation of genocide as a crime, the principle that every national,
racial and religious group has a natural right of existence is claimed."' 04
Lemkin lost almost all of his family to the Nazi genocide of Jews and
devoted the rest of his life to advocating for the U.N. adoption of a convention
against genocide.' The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide was adopted in 1948,106 with Article 2 providing that
genocide is
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part,
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

0 7

Of the legacy of the term "genocide," it has been written by Michael
Ignatieff that "Lemkin would have been astonished and indignant at the
afterlife of his word-how victim groups of all kinds have pressed it into
service to validate their victimization, and how powerful states have eschewed

GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS

79 (Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 2d ed. 2008) (emphasis

added).
103 Id.
Raphael Lemkin, Genocide, 15 AM. SCHOLAR 227, 229 (1946).
The introductions to the Second Edition, id, at vii- xxiii, recount Lemkin's assistance in the
Nuremberg trials. For more on Lemkin's single-minded devotion to the adoption of antigenocide measures, see SANDS, supra note 38, at 4, 61, 109,181, 301, 381, 320; Michael
Ignatieff, The Unsung Hero Wo Coined the Term "Genocide", NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 21,
2013),
https://newrepublic.com/article/ 114424/raphael-lemkin-unsung-hero-who-coinedgenocidejhttps://perma.cc/KUQ4-NDSV]; Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, Human Rights and Genocide:
The Work ofLauterpachtandLemkin in Modern InternationalLaw, 20 EJIL 1163 (2009).
'Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
107 Id. art. 2.
104
105
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the word lest it entrain an obligation to act.""o A few years earlier Ignatieff
wrote that "[t]he word that [Lemkin] coined--"genocide"--is now so banalized
and misused that there is a serious risk that commemoration of his work will
become an act of forgetting, obliterating what was so singular about his
achievement." 0 9 Philippe Sands expresses similar and even stronger
concerns."1 0
The crime of genocide, as Lemkin and the U.N. Convention define it, has
not been eradicated in the sixty years which have followed its legal enactment
in 1948. It is for this reason that the term's definition continues to be crucial.
To dilute it through case law holdings and dicta can only heighten the risk that
the victims of genocides will become even more powerless because those who
have suffered from lesser offenses will be able to avail themselves of the term,
and genocide will lose its meaning and force. However pure the intent of the
FSIA judges who created the new genocide exception may have been, the
unintended consequence of the precedential authority their cases represent for
distorted definitions of genocide will resonate in future cases unless these
cases are rectified.
International law is already fraught with politicization, as Martti
Koskenniemi has argued."' The new genocide exception to the FSIA is a
judicial interpretation lacking a basis in statutory terms in what purportedly is
a comprehensive statute," 2 and has led to dubious interpretations of
international law. According to Philippe Sands, over time, since the era of
Lauterpacht and Lemkin, "the crime of genocide has distorted the prosecution
of war crimes and crimes against humanity, because the desire to be labeled a
victim of genocide brings pressures on prosecutors to to indict for that
crime."113 He further notes that none of this has had any effect in lessening the
incidences of mass killings.114
The next problematic aspect of the genocide exception is the exhaustion
of local remedies requirement with which it has been coupled in confusion
about the FSIA and international law. This is the topic of Subpart B.
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The Exhaustion Requirement

1.

Why Customary International Law Applies to Parties Before
International Tribunals
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The exhaustion requirement originates from the system of diplomatic
protection based on the idea that when an individual was harmed, his state was
offended and would take action on his behalf."' According to Theodor
Meron,
there is a well-known proposition, according to which the rule of local
remedies is applicable only to cases which are genuine cases of
diplomatic protection, and is not [even] applicable to cases primarily
based on a direct breach of international law, causing immediate injury
by one State to another (hereinafter referred to as cases of 'direct
injury'). The distinction between cases of diplomatic protection and
cases of direct injury is generally recognized. Professor Jessup
observes that various situations in the history of international claims
reveal that in addition to the rights of its nationals a state has, in its
relations with other states, certain rights which appertain to it in its
collective or corporate capacity. The typical cases are those in which
injury is done to an official of the state, particularly a consular or
diplomatic official. Treatises on international law contain many
examples of categories of acts of one State considered to involve a
direct injury to another State, and as such not subject to the
[exhaustion ofl local remedies rule .116
The exhaustion requirement aimed to defuse tensions between the two
nations, one of which was protecting its citizen hurt abroad. In the era of
international courts, in cases such as Interhandel," cited by Abelesz,"' the
rule continued to serve that purpose. The Restatement (Third) of UnitedStates
Foreign Relations §713, Reporters' Note 5, citing the famous Interhandel
court, explains the exhaustion rule as follows: it "has generally been observed
in cases in which a State has adopted the cause of its national whose rights are
claimed to have been disregarded in another State in violation of international
law."" 9
The Restatement also accurately summarizes Interhandel as

115

See EMMERICH DE VATTEL,
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Theodor Meron, The Incidence of the Rule ofExhaustion ofLocal Remedies, 35 BRIT. Y.B.
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Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1959 I.C.J. 6 (1959).
118 See Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2012).
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characterized by the lis pendens situation involving an ongoing suit in the
United Sates, which weighed substantially in the International Court of
Justice's (ICJ) decision. As the ICJ explained in Interhandel, the case
involved the diplomatic protection by Switzerland of its citizen. Therefore, it
fit squarely within the traditional customary international law exhaustion of
local remedies standard. 2 0
The exhaustion requirement also serves an important additional goal in
international tribunal cases. It secures the adherence of member states to the
international court system by ensuring the ongoing subsidiarity of the
international court to the national courts.' 2 ' However, under customary
international law, it does not apply outside of international tribunals: "Without
exception, customary international law limits the local remedies rule to two
situations: (1) States exercising diplomatic protection and (2) plaintiffs,
whether public or private, bringing claims before international tribunals."' 2 2
2.

Confusing the International Customary Law Exhaustion Rule for
International Tribunals with Domestic Courts

The exhaustion requirement runs counter to the international law
referenced in the FSIA. It may have had its origin in the lack of more precise
instruction in the Restatement (Third), now remedied.' 23 Under international
customary law, as correctly explained in the Restatement (Third), an
exhaustion of local remedies is appropriate where two states are before an
international tribunal.' 24 The earlier Restatement did not explicitly state that
there is no similar requirement, for the reasons explained below, in domestic
courts where both parties are not states, as in FSIA cases, in which parties are
before a domestic tribunal and one of the parties is an individual. 2 5

120 See id. at 45.
121 See A.A. CAN(ADO TRINDADO, THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL
REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

9-10 (1983); Paula Rivka Schochet, A New Rolefor an Old

Rule : Local Remedies and Expanding Human Rights JurisdictionUnder the Torture Victim
ProtectionAct, 19 COL. HuM. R. LAW. REv. 223, 227, 235 (1987).
122
Brief of Professor William S. Dodge as Amicus Curiae In Support Of Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 911 F.3d 1172 (2018) (No. 17-7146), 2018 WL 722563 at *10.
123 As the Restatement (Fourth) was being drafted, the Abelesz decision was brought to the
attention of the new Restatement's drafters, prompting explicit criticism of a FSIA local
exhaustion rule. (The author was part of the Members Consulative Committee of the
Restatement). See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH), supra note 15, § 455, reporter's note 9.
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Thus, in Abelesz'2 6 the court cited to the Restatement (Third) but made no
distinctions between Abelesz' own domestic court jurisdictional inquiry and
the international tribunal issue that the Restatement (Third) was discussing.12 7
It quoted the Restatement (Third) § 713 Comment (f) and sources cited
therein, including Ian Brownlie and Interhandel, for the proposition that
"[u]nder international law, ordinarily a state is not required to consider a claim
by another state for an injury to its national until that person has exhausted
domestic remedies... 128
The court did not comment on the fact that it was a domestic court and
that the proposition it was citing explicitly referenced international tribunals.
In Fischer, the court acknowledged that the FSIA text does not require
exhaustion. Affirming Abelesz, however, it held that, "[e]ven though § 1605
(a)(3) itself does not require exhaustion, we went on to conclude [in Abelesz]
that the provision's reliance on international law norms made clear that
plaintiffs would need to exhaust domestic remedies before they could assert a
violation of customary international law in a United States court. This
exhaustion principle, based on comity, is a well-established rule of customary
international law."1 29

That comity does not require imposing an exhaustion rule has now been
supported by several sources, including the D.C. Circuit. 3 0 From a purely
comity perspective, in the genocide-related cases that have arisen, the
defendant states generally have repudiated the acts and regimes of their own
former governments at issue. Comity thus is less of a concern when the state
whose acts are the object of the suit is a predecessor of half a century that had
a completely different political orientation, such as a fascist or Nazi regime.
On the other hand, comity would be a far greater concern for a US court asked
to repudiate a contemporaneous adverse foreign court judgment when
plaintiffs request a rehearing by the FSIA court after unsuccessfully
exhausting their remedies in the state that originally expropriated their
property.
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'

In addition, the exhaustion requirement sets an extraordinarily high bar
for plaintiffs. The Abelesz court held, and was affirmed three years later after
the case had wended its way on remand back to the Seventh Circuit sub nom
Fischer, that only where a foreign court's dismissal of the plaintiffs claims
were "sham or inadequate" would the US court be willing to rehear the case.' 3
Moreover, Congress was clear about its intention to make the FSIA a
comprehensive statute, as the Supreme Court held in 2014, the year before
Fischer was decided.' 32 The Court emphatically declared that FSIA
arguments and decisions must be based exclusively on the FSIA's text.' 33
The creation of an exception based on the human rights violation of
genocide, which seemed to emanate from a desire to provide FSIA jurisdiction
to victims of genocide for practical purposes, is negated in practice by
coupling it with a local exhaustion of remedies requirement. In such cases,
plaintiffs will be asking the FSIA court to rehear a case in which the current
foreign state's courts have dismissed the action. In terms of comity, under US
rules of enforcing foreign judgments, foreign judgments generally are entitled
to the same recognition as those of US States, and reasons for non-recognition
reflect the US court's view that the foreign judiciary "does not provide
impartial tribunals" 3 4 or lacks "procedures compatible with fundamental
principles of fairness,"' 35 or that a judgment was issued by an "inadequate
legal system."' 36 In his article on international comity, William Dodge has
noted that in the Alien Tort Statute situation, "an exhaustion requirement
might be justified as an exercise of the federal courts' authority to shape the
federal common law cause of action,"13 7 but in a footnote on Fischer, he
concludes that "there is no similar basis of authority for imposing an
exhaustion requirement on international law claims more generally."' 38
The Abelesz-Fischer case is the only one to date in which plaintiffs did
attempt to exhaust their remedies locally, in Hungary. The plaintiffs claim
was dismissed there for, among other reasons, failing to produce documentary
Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 681 (7th Cir. 2012); Fischer v. Magyar
Allamvasutak Zrt., 777 F.3d 847, 855 (7th Cir. 2015). The term "sham or inadequate" is from
the RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 3, § 713 cmt. f.
132 Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 573 U.S. 134, 141 (2014).
133 See id. at 140-41.
134 RESTATEMENT FouRTH, supra note 15, § 483, cmt b.
135 RESTATEMENT (FOURTH), supra note 15, § 483 cmt. c.
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evidence of the property for which she was seeking compensation, which had
been taken from her on the Hungarian railway station on her way to
Auschwitz.' 39 An idea of the mammoth difficulties of accessing documentary
evidence and archives pertaining to Holocaust-related property ownership in
Hungary can be gleaned from Susan Faludi's 2016 account of her own futile
searches over the years. 140
The Restatement (Fourth) has been explicit in criticizing the Seventh
Circuit's application of the exhaustion rule:
These decisions add a substantive requirement for jurisdiction that is
not supported by the statute or its legislative history. By comparison,
consider the "opportunity to arbitrate" precondition that was explicitly
included in the text of the state-sponsored terrorism exception at §
1605A(a)(2)(A)(iii) ... [T]he rule cited by the Abelescz court applies
by its terms to "international," not domestic, proceedings.
Accordingly, the interpretation of the statute that does not require
exhaustion appears to be the proper one.141
3.

The D.C. Circuit: Simon and Phillip

In 2016, one year after the Seventh Circuit had decided Fischer, the D.C.
Circuit echoed Fischer's views on exhaustion in Simon: "The defendants
could contend that, even if the claims at issue fit within § 1605 (a)(3) so as to
enable the exercise of jurisdiction, the court nonetheless should decline to
exercise jurisdiction as a matter of international comity unless the plaintiffs
first exhaust domestic remedies (or demonstrate that they need not do so)."142
On remand, the district court required exhaustion of remedies in Hungary.1 43
In 2018, however, a year after this last decision, the D.C. Circuit changed
path with respect to the exhaustion of local remedies in the appeal of
Philipp.144 It did continue to apply the genocide exception, however.1 45 The

139 A copy of the English translation of the Hungarian decision is on file with the author. The
US suit was a class action, but since Hungary does not have class-action lawsuits, only one of
the plaintiffs from the US suit made the claims in Hungary. The author was an amica in that
case.
140
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(Fourth), supra note 15, § 455 cmt. 9 (emphasis added).
Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 812 F.3d 127,149 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing Fischer v. Magyar
Allamvasutak Zrt., 777 F.3d 847, 859-66 (7th Cir. 2015).
143 Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 277 F. Supp. 3d 42 (D.D.C. 2017).
1" Philipp v. Federal Republic of Germany, 894 F.3d 406, 416 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
145
Id. at 411. In the court's analysis of the taking as part of genocide, there is some incongruity
between the convincing demonstration of property expropriation as having been an integral part
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'

Philippappellate court characterized the appellate decision in Simon as having
left the issue of exhaustion open, but the court reasoned that the US Supreme
Court's assessment of the FSIA in NML Capital v. Republic ofArgentina as
self-containing and text-based precluded the exhaustion of local remedies.1 46
The court further explicitly rejected the Seventh Circuit's analysis,
disagreeing that NML Capital allowed for the application of an international
comity-based prudential exhaustion requirement in determining FSIA
jurisdiction.1 47 It further noted the new Restatement (Fourth)'sexplanation
that international customary law has an exhaustion requirement only for
international tribunal cases, not domestic courts such as US FSIA courts.1 48
Moreover, before Abelesz, Fischer and Simon were decided, the D.C.
Circuit had precedential authority squarely against applying an exhaustion
rule to FSIA cases, and the D.C. Circuit returned to this line of analysis in
Philipp.14 9 Although Philipp did not cite to the particular case of De Csepel
in that line, the D.C. district court in De Csepel had explicitly rejected
Fischer' in 2016 for having misunderstood the customary international law
rule of Interhandeland the Restatement (Third).' 5
In 2018, the D.C. Circuit reversed the lower court's decision in Simon,1 52
reaffirming its holding in Philipp. This appellate court was the first to
recognize that the exhaustion requirement effectively negates a plaintiffs
ability to avail itself of a US court's jurisdiction because of what will
essentially be the res judicata effect of a likely dismissal in the country that
allegedly perpetrated the human rights violataion against the plaintiff 15' Like
the Simon lower court and Philipp, however, the D.C. Circuit court continued
to equate the property expropriation plaintiffs underwent with genocide.

of Nazi genocide with how this fits the takings provision of the FSIA. See id. at 412-414. The
substantive citizenship doctrine would have covered the Philipp plaintffs without the genocide
exception.
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CONCLUSION

Congress expressed an intent to protect discriminatory takings in Section
1605(a)(3) at the same time that it set out to create a comprehensive statute.
The provisions of the text referring to violations of international law have been
interpreted since inception to refer to customary international law. Over time,
the courts developed a test that used a substantive citizen standard, such that
the domestic takings rule that provides immunity to states for expropriations
perpetrated against their own citizens would not apply to victims of the gravest
international human rights violations. This development solved the human
rights issue that had arisen in Princz and similar cases.
The recent evolution in the Seventh and Second Circuits and a California
district court to carve out an explicit exception to FSIA immunity for
genocide-related cases seems ill-advised. It risks trivializing genocide and has
in one circuit to date led to the imposition of a rule of local exhaustion, the
latter now rejected by the D.C. Circuit. That rule makes a rehearing in the
United States extremely unlikely where the defendant state's courts hear
plaintiffs' claims locally and deny recovery.
Some of the confusion in courts' FSIA holdings may have stemmed from
lack of clarity in the Restatement (Third), now remedied in the new
Restatement (Fourth). As US courts continue to develop FSIA jurisdictional
standards while remaining true to the statute, they will need to be ever better
instructed in international law and its ongoing evolution in our
transnationalizing world when they apply the capacious term of "violations of
international law" to Section 1605(a)(3) claims.

